The puzzle Shelley presented to her contemporaries is well worth our consideration, for what seems to suggest a simple discrepancy between art and life actually points to a lifetime of self-division, the result of one woman's attempt to conform simultaneously to two conflicting prescriptive models of behavior. On the one hand, both as the daughter of William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft and as the lover and then wife of Percy Shelley, Mary was encouraged from her youth to fulfill the Romantic model of the artist, to prove herself by means of her pen and her imagination. "In our family," Mary's stepsister Claire Clairmont once wryly remarked, "if you cannot write an epic poem or novel, that by its originality knocks all other novels on the head, you are a despicable creature, not worth acknowledging" (Marshall, II, 248). On the other hand, this pressure to be "original" was contradicted by the more prevalent social expectations that a woman conform to the conventional feminine model of propriety, that she be self-effacing and supportive, devoted to a family rather than to a career. Caught between these two models, Shelley developed a pervasive personal and artistic ambivalence toward feminine self-assertion. Each of her six novels reflects this ambivalence to a greater or lesser degree; they are all riddled with competing tendencies because they simultaneously fulfill and punish her desire for self-expression. Because her works demonstrate the difficulties that the conflicting expectations of this transitional period posed for a woman writer, Mary Shelley emerges as an important figure, even though she never fully achieved the personal or the aesthetic self-confidence necessary to integrate her imaginative efforts.
The sources and the extent of Shelley's ambivalence are vividly set out in the two editions of her most famous novel, Frankenstein. The first edition, published in 1818, when Mary was just twenty and not yet married, is as bold and original a work as the novelist ever conceived. But even though the 1818 Frankenstein addresses an undeniably unorthodox subject, it does so with conservative reservations, which have been largely overlooked by both nineteenthand twentieth-century commentators. For in the course of her unladylike metaphysical speculations, Shelley explodes the foundations of Romantic optimism by demonstrating that the egotistical energies necessary to self-assertion -energies that appear to her to be at the heart of the Romantic model of the imaginationinevitably imperil the self-denying energies of love. To accommodate this reservation, which implicitly indicts all artistic endeavors as well as more insidious forms of egotism, Shelley essentially feminizes Romantic aesthetics, deriving from her contemporaries' theories strategies that enable her to fulfill her desire for self-expression in an indirect, self-effacing, and therefore acceptable manner. But in the 1831 edition of her youthful production, Shelley finds even this qualified self-assertion too audacious. Despite her claims to "have changed no portion of the story, nor introduced any new ideas or circumstances,"3 the introduction she added to the third edition and the revisions she made in the text suggest that by 1831 Shelley wants to apologize for her adolescent audacity, to explain that she, like Frankenstein, is terrified by the product of what she now considers a "frightful transgression." Even in 1831, however, Shelley does not fully accept responsibility for her earlier "crime," nor does she wholly renounce the artistic enterprise she claims to find so blasphemous. For by dramatizing herself-just as she does the 1831 Frankenstein-as the victim of forces beyond her control, she elevates the dilemma of the female artist to the status of myth and sanctions the very self-expression she professes to regret. The reversals within each of the texts reveal the contradictions of a painfully self-divided desire; taken together, the two editions of Frankenstein provide a case sudy in the tensions inherent in the feminine adaptation of the Romantic "egotistical sublime."
Even though Frankenstein's first reviewers praised the work's power and stylistic vigor, they sharply criticized the unknown novelist's failure to moralize about her startling, even blasphemous subject. In this respect, the verdict of the Quarterly Review is typical:
Our taste and our judgment alike revolt at this kind of writing, and the greater the ability with which it may be executed the worse it is-it inculcates no lesson of conduct, manners, or morality; it cannot mend, and will not even amuse its readers, unless their taste have been deplorably vitiated-it fatigues the feelings without interesting the understanding; it gratuitously harasses the heart, and only adds to the store, already too great, of painful sensations.4
Presumably because a refusal to moralize was unthinkable for a woman, most critics automatically assumed the author of Frankenstein to be a man-no doubt a "follower of Godwin," according to Blackwood's; possibly even Percy Shelley himself, thought the Edinburgh Magazine (Grylls, p. 315). But these reviewers leaped too hastily to conclusions, not only about the sex of the young writer but also about the author's supposed defiance of conventional morality. For while the obvious unorthodoxy of Frankenstein's subject, coupled with its unusual narrative strategy, seems to mock propriety, close attention to the scientist's story reveals a deeply critical attitude toward the egotism Mary Shelley read in the works of her male contemporaries. Like many other Romantic artists, Shelley focuses on the theme of Promethean desire, which has implications both for the development of culture and for the individual creative act. But besides the beneficial results imagined by Coleridge, Wordsworth, Byron, and Percy Shelley, the gifts Mary Shelley's "modern Prometheus" brings threaten to destroy society and the blasphemous artist as well.5
Like many male Romantics, Shelley discusses desire within a paradigm of individual maturation: Frankenstein is Shelley's version of that process of identity formation Keats called "soulmaking." In the 1818 text, Shelley's model of maturation begins with a realistic depiction of Lockean psychology; young Victor is a tabula rasa whose character is formed by circumstantial influences. The son of loving, protective parents, the companion of affectionate friends, Frankenstein soon finds the harmony of his childhood violated by what he calls a "predilection" for natural philosophy. Yet Frankenstein locates the origin of this inclination not in his innate disposition but in a single childhood accident-the chance discovery of a volume of Cornelius Agrippa's occult speculations. The "fatal impulse" this volume sparks is then kindled into passionate enthusiasm by other accidents: Victor's father neglects to explain Agrippa's obsolescence, a discussion provoked by a bolt of lightning explodes Victor's belief in the occult, and "some accident" prevents Frankenstein from attending lectures on natural philosophy. Left with a craving for knowledge but no reliable guide to direct it, he is able to keep his curiosity within bounds only through the "mutual affection" of his domestic circle.
In protector" (p. 40). Cut loose from domestic regulations, the youth exercises a bold confidence in his innate impulses and capacities; he believes that his desire to conquer death through science is fundamentally unselfish and that he can be his own guardian. But, as Mary Shelley ruthlessly proves, both these comforting assumptions are only tricks by which his desire-or, as Frankenstein calls it, his "ardent imagination" -blinds him to its own essential "self-devotion." The course of Frankenstein's decline suggests, in fact, that in the absence of social regulation the formation of the ego is primarily influenced by the imagination's longing to deny fundamental human limitations-in particular, the body's determinate bondage to nature and to death. Frankenstein "penetrate[s] into the recesses of nature" in search of the secret of life, but what he discovers in the "vaults and charnel houses" is the "natural decay and corruption of the human body." Death is the initial and obsessive focus of the imagination, just as it will be, through the agency of the monster, its final product. But Frankenstein's imagination, swollen with self-importance, refuses to acknowledge that his own body is a part of this chain of natural processes; Victor rationalizes his absorption in "corruption and waste" as necessary to the intellectual mastery of death, and he plots his perpetuity even as he plans the creature that will express and eventually put an end to his egotism.
Frankenstein's fatal impulse also has profound social consequences, for the vanity that convinces the scientist of the benevolence and power of his imagination is one expression of the essential, egotistical drive to assert and extend the self-to deny not only one's own mortality but also, to use Kant's phrase, the otherness of others. Thus Frankenstein's love for his family is the first victim of his growing obsession. His filial affection is displaced by "supernatural enthusiasm": "I wished, as it were, to procrastinate all that related to my feelings of affection until the great object, which swallowed up every habit of my nature, should be completed" (p. 50). He isolates himself in a "solitary chamber," refuses to write even to his fiancee, Elizabeth, and grows "insensible to the charms of nature." "I became as timid as a love-sick girl," Frankenstein realizes in retrospect, "and alternate tremor and passionate ardour took the place of wholesome sensation and regulated ambition" (p. 51).
In criticizing the indulged imagination, Mary The heightened images of the self cast back from nature then help the child develop a sense of independent identity and power. In marked contrast, Mary Shelley distrusts both the imagination and the natural world. The imagination, as it is depicted in Frankenstein's original transgression, is incapable of projecting an irradiating virtue, for in aiding and abetting the ego the imagination carries death-dealing, selfish desire into the domestic arena. By extension, nature is also suspect because, as the avatar of death, it lacks altogether the humane, moral aspect institutionalized in the family and society. Thus Mary Shelley does not depict numerous natural theaters into which individuals can project their growing desires and from which affirmative echoes will hasten maturation. Instead, she continues to dramatize personal fulfillment strictly in terms of the child's original domestic harmony, with the absent mother being replaced by the closest female equivalent; ideally, Elizabeth would link Frankenstein's maturity to his youth, just as Mrs. Saville would anchor the mariner Walton. Ideally, in other words, the beloved object would be sought and found only within the comforting confines of preexistent domestic relationships. In this model, Shelley therefore ties the formation of personal identity to self-denial rather than to self-assertion, to a sort of perpetual childhood, entailing relational self-definition and dependence, rather by the yearning to deny that kinship. In retrospect, Frankenstein knows that the winds will more likely bring a storm than calm, but in the blindness of his original optimism, he believes that nature is hospitable, that it offers an "ennobling interchange" to console and elevate the soul. Still trusting himself and the natural world, Frankenstein cries out with "something like joy" to the spirit of the Alps, as if it were a compassionate, as well as a natural, parent; "Wandering spirits . . . allow me this faint happiness, or take me, as your companion, away from the joys of life." But Frankenstein's belief in natural benevolence, like his earlier confidence in the benevolence of his desire, proves a trick of the wishful imagination. His request is answered by the true spirit of this and every place untamed by social conventions-the "superhuman," "unearthly" monster. Lulled once more by his desiring imagination, Frankenstein again fails to recognize the character of his bond with nature until that bond stands before him, incarnate in the monster.
To understand why Mary Shelley's first readers did not fully appreciate what seems in comparison to Romantic optimism to be an unmistakable critique of the imagination, we must turn to the monster's narrative. For Shelley's decision to divide the novel into a series of first-person narratives instead of employing a single perspective, whether first-person or omniscient, effectively qualifies her judgment of egotism. Because the monster, in particular, voices its own pain, the reader is asked to participate not only in Frankenstein's pathetic desire for innate and natural benevolence but also in the agonizing repercussions of this wishful desire.
In the monster's narrative, Shelley both re- For the monster, self-consciousness comes with brutal speed, for recognition depends not on an act of transgression but only on literal selfperception. An old man's terror, a pool of water, a child's fear are all nature's mirrors, returning the monster repeatedly to its grotesque self, "a figure hideously deformed and loathsome . . . a monster, a blot upon the earth" (pp. 115-16). When the creature discovers its true origin-not in the social texts it learns to read but in its maker's notebooks-it can no longer deny the absolute "horror" of its being, the monstrous singularity of egotism: "the minutest description of my odious and loathsome person is given, in language which painted your own horrors, and rendered mine ineffaceable" (p. 126). From this moment on, the monster's attempts to contradict its nature are as desperate as they are futile. In its most elaborate effort, the creature hides in a womblike hovel, as if it can be born again into culture by aping the motions of the family it watches. Although the monster tries to disguise its true nature by confronting only the blind old father, De Lacey's children return and recognize its "ineffaceable" monstrosity and what it signifies. Their violent reaction, the rejection by its "adopted family," at last precipitates the monster's innate nature; abandoning man's "godlike science"-the language of society so diligently learned-for its natural tongue-the nonsignifying "fearful howlings" of beasts-the monster embarks on its systematic destruction of domestic harmony. The creature makes one final attempt to form a new society, but when Frankenstein refuses to create a female monster, the monster is condemned, like his maker, to a sin-gle bond of hatred. After Frankenstein's death, the creature disappears into the darkness of the novel's end, vowing to build its own funeral pyre, for it is as immune to human justice as it was excluded from human love.
The monster carries with it the guilt and alienation that attend Frankenstein's self-assertion; yet, by having the monster itself realistically detail the stages by which it is driven to act out its symbolic nature, Shelley compels the reader to identify with the creature's anguish and frustration. The first-person, symbolic presentation of the monster within a literalized landscape thus qualifies Shelley's condemnation of self-assertion -so effectively, in fact, that generations of critics and cinematographers have awarded the creature its maker's name and place. For Mary Shelley, displacing the emotional dimension of Frankenstein's transgression onto the essentially powerless monster is primarily a means of indirectly dramatizing her emotional investment in Frankenstein's creative act-and her profound ambivalence toward it. The degree of pathos in the monster's cry suggests that Shelley most unequivocally identifies with the product, and the price, of Frankenstein's transgression: the objectified ego, helpless and alone. Perhaps, as we will see when we discuss her 1831 introduction, the monster's condition seemed to Shelley the appropriate fate for the self-assertive, "masculine," and therefore monstrous female artist.
Shelley's depiction of the monster allows for indirection because a symbol is able to accommodate different, even contradictory meanings. Although in an important sense Frankenstein's imagination loses potential semantic richness by being literalized in the monster (e.g., its possibilities of transcendent power or beneficence), this narrative strategy does allow Shelley to express her sympathy for the creative enterprise without explicitly retracting her earlier judgment of it. In other words, using symbolism at this point in the narrative enables Shelley to express two opinions, to record precisely her own divided attitude toward Frankenstein's imaginative act.
We can best understand the function symbolism plays for Mary Shelley by contrasting her use of it with Percy Shelley's significantly different description of the symbolic in his preface to the 1818 Frankenstein. In his well-known justification for the central scene, Percy stresses not the ambivalence of the symbol but its comprehensiveness and its power: "However impossible as a physical fact, [this incident] affords a point of view to the imagination for the delineating of human passions more comprehensive and commanding than any which the ordinary relations of existing events can yield" (p. 6). Although we know from the Shelleys' letters and from the surviving manuscript of Frankenstein that Percy was instrumental in promoting, and even in revising, the text,9 Mary did not uncritically or wholeheartedly embrace the aesthetic rationale by which Percy justified this self-confident use of symbolism or the artistic enterprise of which it is only a part. In fact, Mary Shelley feminizes Percy's version of the Romantic aesthetic, using her lover's theories to justify the very strategies that enabled her to find an acceptable, nonassertive voice. For, unlike her defiant lover, Mary was not immune to public opinion or oblivious to conventional propriety. Percy's defiance of society was based on his confidence in the innate morality of the imagination, an assumption Mary did not share, and it resulted in a bold self-confidence that would appear, in a woman, to border on unconscionable self-assertion. In Frankenstein, therefore, Mary Shelley harnesses Percy's aesthetic theories to her own more conservative assumptions and thus fundamentally alters the implications of his ideas. By adopting a narrative strategy that insists on the reader's sympathetic engagement with even the monstrous part of her self, she simultaneously satisfies Percy's standards for true art and her own conflicting needs for self-assertion and social acceptance. The three-part narrative structure enables her to establish her role as an artist through a series of relationships rather than through an act of selfassertion; and because she does not limit herself to a single perspective she also avoids taking Like Frankenstein, Robert Walton is from his youth motivated by an obsession that scorns the empirical, superficial understanding of nature. Despite contrary facts, Walton believes that the North Pole is a "region of beauty and delight" (p. 9) and longs to "satiate [his] ardent curiosity" by penetrating its secrets. Walton's ambition, like Frankenstein's, masquerades as a desire to benefit society, although it too is really only the egotist's desire for "glory." Whereas Frankenstein transgresses metaphysical boundaries in his experiments, Walton defies geographical limitations in his exploration, but both men transgress against their domestic relationships to indulge their desires. Walton's only living relative is Margaret Saville, the sister with whom he initially corresponds, but as Walton's ship sails farther into the wastes of ice, his narrative becomes nearly as self-contained as Frankenstein's monologue; the outward gesture of writing to another gradually gives way to the more "selfdevoted" habit of keeping a journal, of addressing a letter to his future self.
Percy
Despite the similarities in the aspirations of the two men, Walton's ambition remains only an embryonic version of Frankenstein's murderous egotism, for Walton does not allow his obsession to destroy relationships. Walton's crucial distinction is his willingness to deny his desire when it jeopardizes his social responsibilities or his relational identity. Walton constantly thinks of himself in terms of relationships: he is from his childhood an "affectionate brother," and he conceives of maturity as an extension of the regulating influence of others. The "evil" Walton laments is not the mortality of the individual (as death was the "most irreparable evil" to Frankenstein) but the individual's innate insufficiency: Walton too is a pawn of internal forces that, syntactically, seem not his own ("there is a love . . . which hurries me"). Thus, although in the 1831 text Walton's ambition is more pronounced, more like the young Frankenstein's, he is not wholly responsible for his actions. Just as Mr. Waldman is the external catalyst that precipitates Frankenstein's "destiny," so Frankenstein serves as the critical agent for Walton. Frankenstein's narrative resolves Walton's internal conflict and restores to him that domestic affection which has been all along the innate "groundwork of [his] character." Walton does not really assert himself or actively choose; rather, true to his character, to his original self-denying nature, he allows himself to be acted on by others, to respond to the needs of Frankenstein, then to those of the sailors in his charge. Of the three narrations that compose Frankenstein, the monster's history receives the least attention in the 1831 revisions-no doubt be-cause by this time Shelley sympathized even more strongly with the guilt and alienation that attend the egotist's crime. Moreover, by implication, the monster has become the appropriate extension of the curse of the artist, not the product of the self-indulgent ego. The monster's grotesqueness, its singularity are still signs of an essential transgression, but its pathetic powerlessness is now a more appropriate equivalent of the helplessness of Frankenstein himself.
It is interesting to speculate about the significance of these changes for Mary Shelley, to ask why she made her judgment of Frankenstein more specific and more severe at the same time that she relieved him of responsibility for his "destiny." I think the most important clues can be found in the introduction Shelley added to the 1831 text. There, in her selective memory of her younger self, she reveals a deep sense of kinship with the 1831 Frankenstein; she feels guilty about her "frightful" transgression perhaps but, in a saving sense, not responsible for the "hideous progeny" she created in the unladylike text of 1818.
Shelley's primary purpose in the 1831 introduction is to explain-and justify-the audacity of what now seems like blasphemy, to silence that question which, repeatedly asked, insistently raises the ghost of her former self: "How I, then a young girl, came to think of, and to dilate upon, so very hideous an idea?" (p. 222). Even this explanation must be justified, however, for Shelley wants most of all to assure her reader that she is no longer the defiant, self-assertive "girl" who, lacking proper humility, once dared to seek fame and to explore the intricacies of desire. Now "infinitely indifferent" to literary reputation, Shelley claims to be "very averse to bringing [her]self forward in print." Her commentary is permissible only because it concerns that other self which is, strictly speaking, not the mature or "personal" Mary Shelley at all: "as it will be confined to such topics as have connection with my authorship alone, I can scarcely accuse myself of a personal intrusion."
Her 1831 version of the dream that suggested the origin of the novel makes clear what Shelley is so eager to disavow: the monster's creator is referred to as an artist, and the artist's transgression (now characterized specifically as blasphemy) is followed by his fear and revulsion as he is forced to recognize in his "odious handywork" some hitherto repressed aspect of himself:
I saw the pale student of unhallowed arts kneeling beside the thing he had put together. I saw the hideous phantasm of a man stretched out, and then, on the working of some powerful engine, show signs of life, and stir with an uneasy, half vital motion. Frightful must it be; for supremely frightful would be the effect of any human endeavour to mock the stupendous mechanism of the Creator of the world. His success would terrify the artist; he would rush away from his odious handywork, horror-stricken. He would hope that, left to itself, the slight spark of life which he had communicated would fade; that this thing, which had received such imperfect animation, would subside into dead matter; and he might sleep in the belief that the silence of the grave would quench for ever the transient existence of the hideous corpse which he had looked upon as the cradle of life. He sleeps; but he is awakened; he opens his eyes: behold the horrid thing stands at his bedside, opening his curtains, and looking on him with yellow, watery, but speculative eyes.
(p. 228)
The boldness with which she once pursued metaphysical speculations now seems, first of all, a defiance of one's proper place-here man's in relation to God but also, by extension, woman's in relation to the family. Clearly here, as in the thematic emphasis of the novel, Shelley expresses the tension she feels between the selfdenying offices of domestic activity and the selfassertiveness essential to artistic creation. Before 1816, she explains, she did not respond to Percy Shelley's encouragement that she write because "travelling, and the cares of a family, occupied [her] time" (pp. 223-24). Now that she has pursued his designs she finds literary production to be a perverse substitute for a woman's natural function: a "hideous corpse" usurps what should be the "cradle of life."12 The monster, with its "yellow, watery, but speculative eyes," is also an objectification of the artist's self, and as such it simultaneously elaborates and diminishes the complex personality that is Mary Shelley. The temptation to become an object may be, as Margaret Homans has suggested, a particularly feminine peril;13 certainly for Mary Shelley objectification proved both alluring and terrifying, as her own testimony reveals. Expressing her self was particularly frightening to Shelley because, as we have seen, the gesture of objectification was for her an exile into the object world of nature-ironically, "maternal nature," which is ultimately death and immediately a literalized landscape that swallows up all attempts at human meaning. In other words, through what Homans identifies as the traditional association of literal meaning with nature's fatality (p. 2), the monster is doomed; objectification drives even this "thing," which longs to speak, which acquires eloquence from the table scraps of human culture, into a realm where the imagination's rich ideas are literalized and impoverished and where the primary vehicle of the imagination, language, loses its power to command more than momentary respect. As Mary Shelley projects her imagination she sees a monster, a vivified corpse, capable of commanding sympathy but, in all its actions and despite its desire, destroying every living being it touches-until, finally, it rejoins the natural world of death itself.
The terror Shelley associates with artistic creation, however, comes not just from the guilt of superseding one's proper role or from a fear of the literal but also from the fear of failure that accompanies such presumption. The creation Shelley imagines is "odious," "horrid," "hideous," imperfectly animated-a failure for all to see. The suggestion that the burden of the artistic creation consists in large part in its profoundly public nature also appears in the 1831 introduction. There Shelley distinguishes between her youthful, private fantasies of pure imagination ("waking dreams . . . which had for their subject the formation of a succession of imaginary incidents" [p. 222]) and the stories she actually wrote down, the "close imitations" she shared with her childhood friend Isabel Baxter. "My dreams were at once more fantastic and agreeable than my writings," she explains. "The airy flights of ... imagination," in fact, she considers her only "true compositions," for what she wrote was in "a most common-place style." To write, for Shelley, is necessarily to imitate, and her models, almost all masculine, are both intimidating and potentially judgmental of her audacious foray into their domain and of what seems the monstrous inadequacy of her objectified self. The fear of public scrutiny and judgment lies behind most of Shelley's disclaimers of the artistic enterprise: "What I wrote was intended at least for one other eye-my childhood's companion and friend; but my dreams were all my own; I accounted for them to nobody; they were my refuge when annoyed-my dearest pleasure when free" (p. 223). Thus when Mary Shelley places her imagination in the service of a text, a discomforting transformation occurs: what was a harmless pastime becomes tantamount to a transgression, and, fueling the attendant guilt, the fear surfaces that if she does compete she will be found inadequate. Only the unbound and therefore nonbinding imagination can escape censure and thus protect the ego against exposure and pain.
Shelley's distinction between imagination and imaginative creation would have surprised many of her male contemporaries. In his "Defence," for example, Percy Shelley does not even consider the possibility of keeping imaginative insights private, for, in his theory, poets have a profoundly public responsibility-they are the "unacknowledged legislators of the World" (p. 508). Percy's description centers on the selfexpressive function of art; his authority derives from a masculine tradition of poet-prophets and his self-confidence from the social approbation accorded masculine self-assertion. Mary Shelley, however, lacking the support of both tradition and public opinion, separates the permissible, even liberating expression of the imagination from the more egotistical, less defensible act of public self-assertion.'4 For Mary Shelley, the imagination is properly a vehicle for escaping the self, not a medium of personal power or even of self-expression. She therefore associates the imagination with images of flight, escape, freedom; writing she associates with monstrosity, transgression, literalization, and failure.
Mary Shelley does not, of course, wholly reject the artistic enterprise, no matter how adamant her renunciation. By 1831, in fact, she was an established professional writer; she supported herself and her son almost exclusively by writing, and her numerous reviews and stories, as well as her three novels, had earned her considerable reputation. Nor does she totally disavow kinship with the more defiant Mary God-win. It is with felt intensity that Shelley vividly recalls her feeling of power when, having dared to imagine a "frightful . . . success," the younger Mary triumphantly silenced her male critics: "Swift as light and as cheering was the idea that broke in upon me. 'I have found it!' . . . On the morrow I announced that I had thought of a story" (p. 228). But Shelley is now able to countenance the creation of Frankenstein-and, in effect, the creation of her entire artistic roleonly because she views these creations as essentially the work of other people and of external circumstances. Thus Shelley "remembers" (sometimes inaccurately) the origin of Frankenstein in such a way as to displace most of the responsibility for what might otherwise seem willful self-assertion; essentially she offers a story that depicts the young Mary Godwin as a creation of others, a pawn, like Frankenstein, of forces larger than herself. Twice Shelley insists on Percy's role in her project, his repeated desire that she "prove [herself] worthy of [her] parentage, and enrol [herself] on the page of fame": "He was for ever inciting me to obtain literary reputation," she adds (p. 223). She also (incorrectly) recalls the pressure her companions at Diodati exerted on her to produce a ghost story for their contest. The degree of embarrassment she records and the vividness of this inaccurate recollection suggest both her internalization of others' assumed expectations and her insistence that the impetus come from outside. "Have you thought of a story? I was asked each morning, and each morning I was forced to reply with a mortifying negative."'5 Defensively, however, Shelley assures herself and the reader that she never entered directly into competition with her intimidating male companions. "The illustrious poets," Byron and Percy Shelley, soon tired of the "platitude of prose," and "poor Polidori" was hardly worth considering (perhaps because both poets openly ridiculed the doctor). "The machinery of a story" is the humblest of all inventions, she continues, reducing her accomplishment to its appropriate stature. All invention, in fact, she considers only a form of piecework: "invention, it must be humbly admitted . . . can give form to dark, shapeless substances, but cannot bring into being the substance itself" (p. 226). Even the "substance" of Shelley's story comes from external sources. Initially, she is provoked by a conversation between Byron and Percy, "to which [Mary] was a devout but nearly silent listener"; and even her active contribution to these ideas ("moulding and fashioning") is dramatized as if it were nearly involuntary. Thus, in 1831, when Shelley revises her depiction of Frankenstein, she invests him with both the guilt she associates with her original audacity and the feeling of helplessness she now invokes to sanction and explain that audacity. In her need to justify her metaphysical boldness Shelley employs an almost Godwinian notion of Necessity: Frankenstein's "character" is Fate incarnate; the artist, driven by Necessity, shadowed by guilt, is the powerless midwife to the birth of such "fatality" within human society itself.
When
The 1831 Frankenstein is neither Mary Shelley's first nor her last embrace of powerlessness. The Last Man (1826), for example, is a protracted study of the "indissoluble chain of events" that sweeps mankind inexorably toward universal destruction, and even the more conventional Falkner (1837) presents "each link of the chain" of the past as having "been formed and riveted by a superior power for peculiar purposes.""' In the course of her career, Shelley's explanation of that power changes, as does her evaluation of it, but consistently after 1818 she invokes some version of Necessity to link the turnings of plots and, more important, to explain her own behavior. Paradoxically, this wholehearted acceptance of an essentially subordinate position-like the symbolic presentation of the monster-affords Shelley precisely the grounds she needs to sanction her artistic endeavors. For the claim to powerlessness not only exonerates her from personal responsibility but also provides a socially acceptable rationale for selfaggrandizement-and thus a means of satisfying simultaneously her need for social approval and her desire to "prove [herself] worthy" of her parents and Percy Shelley. In her depiction of the monster and the 1831 Frankenstein, Mary Shelley essentially raises feminine powerlessness to the status of myth, and thus, as we see in a diary entry from her journal of 1831, she is able to distinguish herself in the very gesture with which she seems to efface herself. As commentary on her life as a self-divided artist, her "apology" is worth quoting at length:
To hang back, as I do, brings a penalty. I was nursed and fed with a love of glory. To be something great was the precept given me by my Father: Shelley reiterated it. Alone and poor, I could only be something by joining a party; and there was much in me-the woman's love of looking up, and being guided, and being willing to do anything if any one supported and brought me forward-which would have made me a good partisan. But Shelley died, and I was alone. My Father, from age and domestic circumstances, could not "me faire valoir." My total friendlessness, my horror of pushing, and inability to put myself forward unless led, cherished and supported,-all this has sunk me in a state of loneliness no other human being has ever before, I believe, endured-except Robinson Crusoe.17
In her subordinate position Shelley finds something genuinely remarkable-a singular status worthy of dramatic presentation, like the omnicompetent victim-vanquisher Robinson Crusoe himself.
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